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Date 10 JAN 91 HRP 89-2

Date 10 JAN 91

29 January 1947

HRP 89-2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, R & E

Subject: The attached draft memorandum

1. Paragraphs 2 through 9 and paragraph 14 of the subject memorandum are premised upon misconceptions expressed in paragraph 1. A critical examination of that paragraph will therefore dispose of more than half of the text under consideration.
2. The tone of this first paragraph (and of paragraphs 2 and 6) implies that the survey conducted by OCD discovered serious deficiencies in the C.I.G. Daily Summary. This interpretation cannot be reconciled with a candid reading of the OCD report, particularly with the expressions of satisfaction and appreciation attributed therein to the President, Admiral Leahy, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, General Eisenhower, and Admiral Nimitz. Actually the findings of the survey were extremely gratifying. To the producers of the Summary it is significant and discouraging that the only allusion they have heard to these findings should have been a belated misinterpretation to the opposite effect.
3. Insofar as the first paragraph depends upon a quotation from Captain Grantham, it is based upon a quotation out of context with consequent distortion. It ignores Captain Grantham's statement that he "likes the summaries just as they are now prepared" and that the President and Admiral Leahy find them "entirely satisfactory."
4. The quotation itself is incomplete. The full text reveals that Captain Grantham himself nullified his own point by conceding that his comment was not based on any change in the substantive context of the Summary, but only on its dissemination. Since there has been no change in dissemination either, the point falls to the ground. The Summary has always been designed primarily for the President, further dissemination being intended to inform others as to the information furnished him. It appears that Captain Grantham made an offhand comment, which he himself realized, on second thought, that he was unable to sustain. It is curious that anyone in C.I.G. should have been unable to realize that also.
5. The remark regarding "some small pique" is absurd in the face of the foregoing. It is contradicted by both the next of the

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OCD report and the further testimony of the officer who interviewed Captain Grantham.

6. The constructive suggestions elicited by the OCD survey (items 1,2,4,5,7,8, and 13 of the "Synopsis") have already been adopted so far as practicable. This point can be sustained in detail if need be.

7. Paragraphs 3-6 of the draft memorandum concern a proposal that certain members of ORE (presumably additional to the present Current Division) be designated to specialize in the production of current intelligence with a view to meeting the "complaints" recorded in the OCD survey. Inasmuch as the survey was commendatory rather than complaining, and inasmuch as its constructive suggestions have already been put into effect to the extent practicable in any case, the supposed need for radical innovation does not exist. We have, of course, already discussed among ourselves the idea of the specialization of additional personnel in current intelligence. Such specialization, without close coordination with the Branches, would tend to impair the quality of the summaries. Assuming the requisite coordination, it is the considered opinion of all concerned in the actual production of the summaries that the question is merely a matter of internal convenience, that the adoption of the idea would be without appreciable effect on their content.

8. Paragraphs 7-9 relate to the idea of several daily summaries on different levels, an idea which appears to be derived essentially from Captain Grantham's ill-founded attempt to distinguish between an original and a subsequent orientation of the Daily toward different levels. The futility of an argument derived from that premise has already been demonstrated.

9. There has been, in the past, some discussion of a special summary for the President and the members of the N.I.A. only. This idea was originally put forward on the ground that certain material now denied us might be made available for a summary of such limited dissemination. We cannot know, of course, what the nature and volume of that material might be, whether it would in fact be made available to us, and whether a summary prepared by us would be the most efficient means of circulating it among so small a group. In any case, it was then agreed that no basis of distinction existed with respect to the information currently available and that the more exclusive summary would not be undertaken until access to appropriate information had been assured. As for a summary for the President alone, we are unable to distinguish between his interests and the collective interests of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy.

10. The idea of a summary prepared, outside of his own office, for the use of the President (or any other particular recipient) without marks of emphasis by his personal staff reveals a certain naivete. Any selection that could be made must necessarily contain items of more immediate interest than others, to which it would be the proper function of a personal staff to call attention. If we were to prepare a separate summary for each recipient of the present

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Daily, we could still never obviate marks of emphasis by an aide in the light of his more intimate knowledge of the recipient's special interests of the moment. We accomplish our function in narrowing the field to a selected group of items all of which are of potential special interest. Considering this in relation to the President, whom our summary is primarily designed to serve, it would be interesting to know how Admiral Leahy would react to an attempt on our part to usurp his function. There is a certain temerity in the contemplation of this idea without consulting him.

11. Paragraph 10 of the draft memorandum proposes a radical change in the character of the weekly. It was originally established as a means of accomplishing what is impossible in the Daily -- the presentation of the most significant current developments in perspective and with consideration of probable consequences. As such, it is an essential supplement to the Daily (see, for example, items 2-5 of the OCD "Synopsis") and is designed primarily to serve the President and the N.I.A., in consonance with N.I.A. Directive No. 1. The proposal is to convert the Weekly into a synopsis of current events, primarily for the presumed benefit of G-2, A-2, and O.N.I. The implicit suggestion that these agencies would obtain, through such a Weekly, all or most of what they need or desire to know of current political and economic intelligence, is fantastic. The service, if any, would be in relieving them of the necessity to publish weeklies of their own for their own purposes. This presupposes a circulation in the hundreds of copies, with all that that implies in relation to content.

12. The present Weekly is a higher order of endeavor than that proposed. It may transcend our present capabilities for completely satisfactory execution, but the Director has enjoined us to aim high. Before it is abolished consideration should be given to the following points:

a. Synoptical weeklies of the type proposed are commonplace, precisely because they are a less demanding task; the selective and analytical approach of the C.I.G. Weekly is unique. Is it desired to abandon this original contribution in favor of a commonplace one? Who will perform this function if C.I.G. does not?

b. Are the President and the N.I.A. better served by a selective and analytical weekly, or by a synoptical one of a sort which it is well known they will not read?

c. Who commands priority in the services of C.I.G., the President and the N.I.A., or G-2, A-2, and ONI?

d. Are the recipients of the present Weekly willing that it should be abolished in favor of the proposed

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substitute? The OCD survey indicates general approval of the present form; even G-2 considers it "excellent and of substantial benefit."

e. Is it known that G-2, A-2, and O.N.I., the supposed beneficiaries of the proposed change, actually desire it?

f. If the proposed Weekly were undertaken, would it actually relieve G-2, A-2, and O.N.I. of the necessity to produce publications oriented toward the particular needs of the several services? Would they actually abolish their own corresponding publications, or would those publications simply be duplicated by yet another of the same type, but so general in character as not to be fully satisfactory to anyone?

13. An alternative to the abolition of the present Weekly in favor of that proposed would be, of course, the publication of both types. That is, however, beyond the capabilities of our present staff, if ORE is to amount to anything more than a magnified Current Division.

14. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the draft memorandum propose a series of monthly situation reports, yet another form of current reporting. Such overemphasis upon routine, periodic reports must inevitably divert the slender resources of ORE from the analysis of fundamental problems, as exemplified in ORE 1, or of emergent critical situations as they develop or are foreshadowed. The already projected program for the ORE series contemplates the preparation of a general coverage of fundamental studies, as a basis for the initial determination of requirements and as a plans of reference for subsequent analyses of emergent situations. Such subsequent reports, however, should be produced as indicated by the developing situation rather than on a routine, periodic basis. The only good idea in this paragraph is the incidental one of a regional rather than a purely national approach, but that point of view is one for which we have already striven.

15. Paragraph 13 presents, in brief and incidental form, what we conceive to be our eventual primary function. All that has gone before is a distraction from it and an impediment to its accomplishment. If the President and the N.I.A. may be regarded as somewhat special recipients within the meaning of the last sentence, it is agreeable. We trust that in most cases we will be writing for them.

16. Paragraph 14 appears to be a sententious reiteration of the idea in paragraphs 7-9 with particular application to estimates. In the ORE series we normally provide a brief summary which will serve to indicate the "must" reading to anyone sufficiently attracted by the title to be interested at all; the remainder may be skipped or read in accordance with the degree of satisfaction provided by

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the summary, or interest aroused thereby. But, as shown in paragraph 10 above, no device will obviate entirely the usefulness of an aide.

17. Paragraphs 15 and 16 concern a further diversion of ORE's limited manpower, already thoroughly dissipated if the preceding recommendations of this draft were adopted, to the preparation of an outline for the National Intelligence Digests in duplication of or conflict with that being prepared by the Defense Project. The eventual responsibilities of ORE with respect to the NID's are as yet ill defined, or rather are entirely subject to dubious inference. If ORE is to have a substantial responsibility in this regard, it were well that it should have more voice than at present in developing the outline, but preparation of a duplicate outline would invite either collision or futility.

18. Paragraph 17 is completely unintelligible to me.

19. Paragraph 18 implies that C.I.G. has not as yet produced any intelligence. ORE has in fact produced a considerable body of intelligence which has been well received, according to the OCD survey. This point is demonstrated in your progress report to 31 December, which the author of the draft memorandum should read. This production is impressive in terms of the resources available, although perhaps not so great as it might have been had the overhead represented in ICAPS and OCD been directed toward the support rather than the distraction and hindrance of ORE. The diversion of effort occasioned by the draft under discussion is a case in point. Its author could better enhance the reputation of C.I.G. were he to address himself to the unsolved problems of interdepartmental coordination and planning, upon the solution of which the further development of an ORE program now depends.

LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE
Chief, Intelligence Staff

ATTACH.
as noted above

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29 January 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, R & E

Subject: The Mission of ORE

1. The true primary mission of ORE is clear in the light of the President's Letter and of N.I.A. Directives No. 1 and No. 2. It is to produce strategic and national policy intelligence through the correlation, evaluation, and final synthesis of all intelligence information and finished departmental intelligence available in the State, War and Navy Departments and other Federal agencies. By "strategic and national policy intelligence" should be understood that intelligence required at the highest policy making and planning level as a basis for the determination of national policy and strategy in the broadest sense. It relates to those issues which are of collective concern to the State, War, and Navy Departments, or, conversely, which are not the exclusive concern of any of them. In this concept ORE has no occasion to duplicate or compete with departmental intelligence agencies - rather it is charged to make full use of them and of their product - but ORE does have the function of final evaluation and final synthesis. The departmental agencies are tributary to it. Its own contribution is the added value provided by authoritative final interpretation and synthesis for the benefit, primarily, of the high authorities whom it serves, and incidentally of the contributing agencies. It must be supported and manned in such a way as to assure that it does speak with recognized authority.

2. Since the inception of N.I.A. Directive No. 5 this clear concept has been confused. That paper introduced considerable ambiguity regarding a research function in ORE. No new authority was required to expand the staff provided to perform the supplemental research found necessary to accomplish the mission indicated in paragraph 1. The initial draft of the Directive, however, had reference to "basic" research, and so alarmed the departmental agencies by its implications regarding duplication and eventual supercession of their activities that ever since there has had to be resort to all sorts of expedient explanations intended to allay these fears. There is reason to suppose that the confusions and contradictions introduced in the course of these explanations result from their expediency and lack of candor. Their general tenor is to give verbal assurance against duplication of functions while at the same time justifying the establishment of duplicate research facilities. To this end it is said that ORE will not conduct research

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in fields of primary interest to any department, but will conduct research at initio in certain undefined fields not of primary interest to anyone. These "gaps" cannot be defined because they do not exist. If, however, this doctrine were taken literally, it would reduce ORE to the status of a drudge performing miscellaneous tasks in the service of the departmental agencies, inverting the order indicated in N.I.A. Directives No. 1 and 2. Never, during the last six months, has there been any indication that C.I.G. understood, or was even aware of, the mission indicated in the preceding paragraph, although that is the primary mission of C.I.G. in the terms of its basic charter, the President's letter.

3. Until this dichotomy is resolved there can be no firm basis for planning the organization, recruitment, and work program or ORE, nor any stability in our relationships with departmental agencies. Hitherto the cart has been put before the horse - we have been required to devise an organization and a T/O to accomplish we know not what, and are now called upon to state the qualifications required in personnel in ignorance of the tasks they may have to perform. It is impossible to determine such qualifications, or to induce the most highly qualified personnel to accept positions in ORE, until this situation has been clarified and stabilized. In any case, no coherent program of research can be based on the concept indicated in paragraph 2. The departmental agencies are as confused as we as to where they stand, and react accordingly. In short, the failure of ICAPS to establish a clear concept of the mission of ORE and of its functional relationship to the departmental agencies is preventing the development of ORE as an effective instrument for the accomplishment of any purpose.

LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE
Chief, Intelligence Staff

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